ou work as a Tier 1 Security Analyst L1 for a Managed Security Service Provider (MSSP). Again, you’re tasked with monitoring network alerts.
An alert triggered: **Misc activity**, **A Network Trojan Was Detected**, and **Potential Corporate Privacy Violation**.
The case was assigned to you. Inspect the PCAP and retrieve the artifacts to confirm this alert is a true positive.
Your tools:
– Brim
– Network Miner
– Wireshark
We need to find an alert signature, so we can use Brim and check if any alert was triggered.
Start opening Brim
choose zone2.pcap file
select the query Suricate Alerts by Source and Destination
An Alert pop-up immediately about “a network trojan was detected” on the IP 185.11.164.8
So lets do a new search with that value and take a look on what happen on that IP
We can see an alert about download trojan, double click on the log to read the details and we get our signature
ET MALWARE Likely Evil EXE download from MSXMLHTTP non-exe extension M2
In the initial look at our ip we had 2 alert, so same drill for different alert
ET POLICY PE EXE or DLL Windows file download HTTP
We see that a lot of stuff happen between our victim and this one IP, we already know it from the precedent 2 questions. just defang it with our Cyberchef (or at those [.], not that hard >D)
185[.]118[.]164[.]8
The log after the alert of the trojan was an http request, flagged as “http”, looking in the details we can find our answer in the left column and in the right column the confirmation that this request is correlated to the following chain of event.
the full URL is the combination of host and uri, then defanged with cyberchef
awh93dhkylps5ulnq-be[.]com/czwih/fxla[.]php?l=gap1[.]cab
We found the name associated to the hash.. and the confirmation that this is no good news for our host
draw.dll
we already noticed in the HTTP traffic
Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 10.0; WOW64; Trident/8.0; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E)
For this I would pick the query “HTTP Requests” and take a look at what we have
we have a many domains creating network traffic whit encoded payload
We can sort for status_code==200 to check which one of those is actually interesting
And 2 domains pass the bouncer
A quick look at virustotal RELATION tab and we can confirm that both the domains are labelled as malicious
Defang them with cyberchef to get the answer
a-zcorner[.]com,knockoutlights[.]com
The initial query “suricata Alerts by Source and Destination” showed us 2 “not suspicious traffic”
defang them as usual to get the answer
64[.]225[.]65[.]166,142[.]93[.]211[.]176
Lets start by checking the first IP on virustotal and look at the relation tab what is reported in the Passive DNS replication
There are many domain, now lets look in Brim and use the Query “Unique DNS Queries” filtering by the IP
and we get our answer (ofc as usual defang with cyberchef)
safebanktest[.]top, tocsicambar[.]xyz, ulcertification[.]xyz
So what did we just witness?
A poor machine happily fetched a shady .cab file from a knockoff-looking domain, unwrapped a juicy draw.dll payload, and strolled straight into the claws of Cridex malware — all while sending GET requests like it was just browsing cat memes.
Suricata kindly screamed “Network Trojan,” VirusTotal lit up like a Christmas tree, and the user-agent tried to pretend it was Internet Explorer 7. On Windows 10. Bold move.
Along the way, we uncovered:
This wasn’t just packet inspection — it was network archaeology.
Time to reimage that host. And maybe send a polite email to the user with “stop clicking stuff” in 72pt Comic Sans.
Cybersecurity learner, log nerd, and TryHackMe badge hoarder. Let’s connect on LinkedIn before I get pulled into another packet capture.
Apparently we have to tell you this: yes, cookies are used. They're not edible, and no, you can't escape them — but you can pick what gets tracked. Yay for EU law!