Initial CTI shows the hash is not flagged by security vendors.
However, Yomi Hunter sandbox reports the file as malware.
No inbound or outbound traffic involving the host 172.16.17[.]82 is recorded during the timeline.
Browser history (no timestamp) shows a Google search for: “how to update chrome”
The page visited:
hxxps://support.google.com/chrome/answer/95414?co=GENIE.Platform%3DAndroid&hl=en
appears legitimate on urlscan.io.
Process tab (again without timestamp) shows:
googleupdate.exe executed by taskeng.exe
Followed by chrome.exe
Followed by execution of:
C:/Users/John/Downloads/Purchase-Order_NO.231101.exe
MD5 of this pe is flagged as malicious / malware trojan/Purchase-Order_NO.231101.exe
While malware was executed, there’s no evidence it is related to this specific alert or event timeline.
Network action: No data shown
Terminal history reveals discovery commands (dir /s, net user, etc.), but again, no timestamp is available to correlate with the event.
Other
Not quarantined
non malicious
This alert was triggered by the execution of googleupdate.exe on the host JohnComputer on September 20th at 21:02 UTC.
After investigation, we determined that the behavior aligns with a legitimate Google Chrome update. The user had recently searched for “how to update Chrome” and visited the official Google support site. No suspicious network traffic was observed, and the process path and behavior are consistent with standard update activity.
Although a malicious executable (Purchase-Order_NO.231101.exe) was later observed, there is no timestamp to confirm its connection to the event in question. Similarly, suspicious CLI commands were logged without any timing correlation.
Given the context and available evidence, the event is considered a false positive.
If confirmed as expected behavior, whitelist the hash or associated process to prevent future false positives.
Ensure endpoint agent coverage is active on this machine for better visibility and timeline correlation in future events.
Consider flagging unrelated malware activity for separate investigation if recurrence or escalation is observed.
Cybersecurity learner, log nerd, and TryHackMe badge hoarder. Let’s connect on LinkedIn before I get pulled into another packet capture.
Apparently we have to tell you this: yes, cookies are used. They're not edible, and no, you can't escape them — but you can pick what gets tracked. Yay for EU law!