CTI shows the hash malicious, delete volume snapshots often used by ransomware.
Reads system information using Windows Management Instrumentation Commandline (WMIC)
No logs related to the host were recorded during the timeline of the event.
No agent is installed — so:
No network action, terminal, or browser history available
Process tab shows malware activity, but with no timestamps, making timeline correlation impossible
Despite this, we can see the execution of ab.exe, followed by WMIC and other commands consistent with known malware behavior.
Other
Not quarantined
Malicious
Not accessed
On 23/5/2021 at 7:32 PM an alert was triggered by a malicious hash associated with behaviors commonly observed in ransomware campaigns. Threat intelligence confirms the file attempts to delete volume shadow copies, an early-stage anti-recovery technique. It also executes WMIC commands to gather system information.
Endpoint telemetry is limited due to the absence of an agent — no network, terminal, or browser activity could be retrieved. However, process data (without timestamps) reveals execution of suspicious binaries such as ab.exe, followed by known ransomware-related behavior (all file encrypted on the machines).
No logs were available in the central log management system, and email telemetry yielded no relevant findings.
Despite the visibility gaps, the presence of ransomware-indicative commands and threat intel confirmation lead to a true positive verdict.
Cybersecurity learner, log nerd, and TryHackMe badge hoarder. Let’s connect on LinkedIn before I get pulled into another packet capture.
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